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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-1224 
_____________ 
 
MICHAEL K. MILLER, 
              Appellant  
 
 v. 
 
 CAROL STEELE-SMITH, Deputy Warden;  
 SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS; BEAVER COUNTY;  
 BETH HARRIS, MSM; BETTY WEGNER, RN; ANGELA PUGH, LPN  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (W.D. Pa. No. 2-15-cv-00662) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Lisa P. Lenihan 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 12, 2017 
 
Before:   CHAGARES, JORDAN, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 6, 2017) 
 _______________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Michael Miller appeals from the grant of summary judgment against him on his  
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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claims that Southern Health Partners, Beth Harris, and Betty Wegner (collectively, the 
“Defendants”) violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.1  Miller claims that 
the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the wrist fracture he suffered in a car 
crash that resulted in his arrest and incarceration for driving under the influence.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. Factual Background2 
 On the night of May 23, 2013, Miller was driving under the influence of alcohol 
and prescription medications, and he crashed his car.  Police officers arrived at the scene 
of the accident and, after tracking Miller to a residence he had fled to on foot, arrested 
him for driving under the influence.  The police then transported Miller to the Heritage 
Valley Emergency Department.  At the time of the arrest, Miller had two prior DUI 
convictions and was on parole.  His criminal behavior and arrest that night constituted a 
violation of his parole.   
                                              
1   Miller had a dual status when he was detained at Beaver County Jail:  he was 
both a pre-trial detainee and a parole revocee.  Case law makes clear that pre-trial 
detainees are protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the 
Eighth Amendment.  Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 
2003).  It is unclear whether the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment affords protections to 
parole revocees, but we need not address that issue now.  Because a Fourteenth 
Amendment claim for inadequate medical care is analyzed pursuant to the same standard 
applied to an Eighth Amendment claim, we will analyze Miller’s claim in accordance 
with that familiar framework.  See id. at 581-82 (explaining “that the Fourteenth 
Amendment affords pretrial detainees protections at least as great as the Eighth 
Amendment” and proceeding to evaluate a pretrial detainee’s claim under the Eighth 
Amendment framework) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
2   When evaluating summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 
(1986). 
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 The Heritage Valley Emergency Department Report noted that Miller had 
abrasions on his left hand and complained only of mild lumbar back pain.  The report did 
not mention an injury to Miller’s left wrist.  Heritage Valley discharged Miller to the 
police, who transported him to Beaver County Jail (“BCJ”).  Miller was, he says, in a 
“blackout” state of intoxication at the time and thus has minimal recollection of the 
events that transpired between his accident and his arrival at BCJ.   
 Nurse Angela Pugh examined Miller the following morning, May 24, as part of 
BCJ’s medical intake screening.  Pugh’s notes on the screening form stated, in relevant 
part, that Miller had cuts to his left hand and was under the influence of alcohol.  
Although Pugh circled “Y” next to the prompt asking if the inmate showed “visible signs 
of ... injury ... or other symptoms suggesting the need for immediate emergency medical 
referral,” she wrote that Miller had been “cleared” by the hospital.  (App. at 113.)  Pugh 
did not note an injury to Miller’s left wrist on the screening form.  Miller completed a 
medical information release form authorizing Heritage Valley to release his medical 
records, including “any/all x-ray/lab results,” to BCJ.  (App. at 45.)  That same day, 
Dr. Earnie Bonatatibus prescribed for Miller two medications:  Flexeril and Motrin.  
BCJ’s medication administration record reflects that Miller received those drugs, as 
prescribed, on May 24, 25, 26, and 27.3  Dr. Bonatatibus also issued an order on May 26 
for Miller to be provided with an extra blanket to elevate his left arm.   
                                              
3  Miller disputes the records showing that he received his pain medication every 
day he was housed at BCJ. (App. at 83 (“I know I was in a great deal of pain and didn’t 
receive pain medication for at least a week at the jail.  I don’t believe I received 
anything.”).)  Putting aside the fact that Miller’s language falls short of a complete denial, 
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 On May 28, Dr. Bonatatibus examined Miller and instructed the medical staff to 
request Miller’s medical records from Heritage Valley to determine if the hospital had 
performed an x-ray of his left wrist.  The doctor instructed that, if not already performed, 
an x-ray of Miller’s left wrist should be scheduled.  Betty Wegner, a registered nurse at 
BCJ, acknowledged Dr. Bonatatibus’s order in writing, and BCJ’s Medical Services 
Manager, Beth Harris, noted the instructions on Miller’s progress notes.  Dr. Bonatatibus 
also discontinued Miller’s Motrin, and prescribed him Naproxen and Tylenol.  BCJ’s 
records reflect that Miller received his medications, as prescribed, on May 28, 29, 30, and 
31.   
 Heritage Valley faxed Miller’s medical records to BCJ on May 28, which 
confirmed no left wrist x-ray had been taken during his May 23 visit.4  Although the fax 
to BCJ was dated May 28, and a handwritten note by an unidentified individual 
confirmed that the records were received on May 28, Harris did not make a notation on 
Miller’s progress notes that the fax was received until May 31.  Accordingly, 
Dr. Bonatatibus was not informed that a left wrist x-ray had not been performed until 
May 31, when he again ordered an x-ray.  That same day, Harris scheduled the x-ray for 
June 3.  The record does not explain why Harris did not note the receipt of the medical 
records until May 31 or why she scheduled the x-ray for June 3.   
                                              
the record contains nothing that would permit an inference that either individual 
defendant was responsible for dispensing Miller’s medication. 
 
4  Heritage Valley had previously provided BCJ with some of Miller’s records 
from his May 23 visit, but that set of records may not have been complete.   
 5 
 
 On June 3, an x-ray of Miller’s left wrist revealed a fracture.  Although Harris did 
not report the x-ray results to Dr. Bonatatibus until June 6, the record is unclear as to 
when Harris first saw the x-ray report.  Harris admits she did not call to check on the x-
ray results and that it was possible she was away from her usual post from June 3 to 
June 6 for electronic medical record training.  In the meantime, Wegner had examined 
Miller on June 4.  The physical assessment form noted that Miller’s left wrist was 
swollen and that there was a fracture.   
 After Harris informed Dr. Bonatatibus of the x-ray results on June 6, 
Dr. Bonatatibus ordered that Miller be examined by an orthopedic specialist.  That same 
day, Harris scheduled an appointment with an orthopedic specialist, Dr. Bernard Hirsch, 
for June 10.  Dr. Hirsch examined Miller on June 10.  Dr. Hirsch recommended that 
Miller be referred to a hand surgeon.   
 Also on June 10, the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County issued an order 
releasing Miller on a $1.00 bond and instructing that Miller be detained and transported 
to a state facility.  BCJ was informed that the transfer would occur on June 13.   
 BCJ’s records reflect that Miller received his medications, as prescribed, from 
June 1 to June 13.  The record also reflects that Miller was provided with a sling or splint 
for his left wrist at some point during his incarceration.   
 Harris filled out Miller’s Inmate Transfer Information form, noting in relevant 
part, that Miller:  (1) had a splint on his left hand/wrist for a diagnosed fracture; (2) was 
on Naproxen and Tylenol; (3) had been seen by an orthopedist on June 10; and 
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(4) required a consultation with a hand surgeon.  Miller was transferred to state custody 
on June 13.   
 Miller was not examined by a hand surgeon until July 3, nearly three weeks after 
Miller’s transfer from BCJ.  The surgeon assessed Miller’s injury as a “[m]alunion left 
distal radius” and explained that, because it had been six weeks since the fracture, the 
“bone [was] nearly completely healed and … in [an] unacceptable alignment.”  (Doc. No. 
55-14.)  The surgeon operated on Miller’s left wrist on August 1.   
II. Procedural History 
 Miller sued Beaver County, Deputy Warden Carol Steele-Smith, BCJ’s medical 
services provider Southern Health Partners, and various John and Jane Doe medical staff 
and prison officials, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he had been subjected to 
cruel and unusual punishment and denied due process of law.  The parties consented to 
the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge.  Miller later amended his complaint 
to add Beth Harris, Betty Wegner, and Angela Pugh as defendants.  Pugh was 
subsequently dismissed from the case by stipulation.  All defendants moved for summary 
judgment, which the Court granted.  Miller does not appeal the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Beaver County and Warden Steele-Smith.  Miller only appeals the 
order granting summary judgment for Southern Health Partners, Harris, and Wegner.   
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III. Discussion5 
 Miller argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in granting summary judgment 
against him because the record contains sufficient evidence for a jury to determine that 
Harris and Wegner were deliberately indifferent to his wrist fracture and that Southern 
Health Partners is liable for its failure to train or supervise Harris and Wegner.  Miller 
further contends that the alleged deliberate indifference resulted in the malunion of his 
wrist.   
 The Eighth Amendment requires that jails provide their inmates with adequate 
medical care.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).  A jail official’s deliberate 
indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs thus runs afoul of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.  Pearson v. Prison Health 
Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05).  To succeed 
on an Eighth Amendment medical care claim, “a plaintiff must make (1) a subjective 
showing that ‘the defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his or her] medical needs’ 
and (2) an objective showing that ‘those needs were serious.’”  Id. (quoting Rouse v. 
Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)).  The parties agree that Miller’s wrist fracture 
was a serious medical need.  Accordingly, our inquiry focuses on whether it was error to 
                                              
5  The Magistrate Judge exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(c)(1) and 
1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a grant of 
summary judgment is de novo.  Tomasso v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702, 705 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2006).  Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine disputes of material fact 
and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.  Again, in reviewing a summary judgment ruling, we view the 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. 
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determine that, as a matter of law, the record cannot support a finding that Harris or 
Wegner acted with deliberate indifference to Miller’s wrist fracture. 
  To make out a subjective showing of deliberate indifference, Miller had to 
demonstrate that Harris and Wegner were “aware of facts from which the inference could 
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed]” and that Harris and Wegner 
also drew that inference.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).  In other words, 
Miller must show that Harris and Wegner “acted or failed to act despite [their] knowledge 
of a substantial risk of serious harm.”  Id. at 842.  Miller can make a subjective showing 
of deliberate indifference by adducing circumstantial evidence that “the excessive risk 
was so obvious that [Harris and Wegner] must have known of the risk.”  Beers-Capitol v. 
Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).   
 We have found prison officials to be deliberately indifferent in a number of 
circumstances, “including where the prison official (1) knows of a prisoner’s need for 
medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical 
treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving 
needed or recommended medical treatment.”  Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197. 
 As we have previously explained, however, a plaintiff cannot show deliberate 
indifference simply by demonstrating negligence in addressing a medical condition or a 
disagreement over the course of treatment received.  Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 
67 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that deliberate indifference requires something “more than 
negligence”); Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 
(3d Cir. 1987) (“[M]ere allegations of [medical] malpractice do not raise issues of 
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constitutional import.”); id. (“[M]ere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment 
[does not] support a claim of an [E]ighth [A]mendment violation.”). 
 A. Delay in Scheduling X-Ray 
 Miller argues that the delay in scheduling his x-ray constituted deliberate 
indifference and that the Magistrate Judge erred in holding, as a matter of law, that the 
delays attributed to Harris did not constitute deliberate indifference.  The Judge provided 
two reasons for why the delay in scheduling Miller’s x-ray was not deliberate 
indifference:  (1) case law dictates a delay in scheduling an x-ray does not constitute 
deliberate indifference, and (2) at most, Harris was negligent.   
 We agree that the record supports, at most, a conclusion of negligence.6  Miller 
contends that Harris delayed scheduling his x-ray by not immediately implementing 
Dr. Bonatatibus’s May 28 order to schedule an x-ray, and by further delaying the 
implementation of Dr. Bonatatibus’s May 31 order to schedule an x-ray, which was not 
then set to occur until June 3.  
                                              
6  We agree with Miller that the facts here are distinguishable from the case relied 
upon by the Magistrate Judge to determine that Harris’s delay in scheduling his x-ray did 
not constitute deliberate indifference.  In that case, Cobbs v. Caputo, 578 F. App’x 84 (3d 
Cir. 2014), we repeated the well-established principle that a “medical decision not to 
order an X-ray … does not represent cruel and unusual punishment.”  Id. at 85 (quoting 
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107) (emphasis added).  Here, Harris’s delay in ordering the x-ray 
was not the result of a medical decision.  Dr. Bonatatibus decided to order the x-ray.  The 
claimed “delay” is instead that Harris did not implement Dr. Bonatatibus’s order 
immediately.  The implicit conclusion that deliberate indifference cannot be shown by a 
delay motivated by a non-medical reason in implementing a doctor’s order is contrary to 
our precedent.  See Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (“We have found ‘deliberate indifference’ in a 
variety of circumstances, including where the prison official … delays necessary medical 
treatment based on a non-medical reason … .”). 
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 As an initial matter, the record contains no evidence that Harris actually received 
Heritage Valley’s fax containing the medical records on May 28.  The record 
demonstrates only that Harris was aware of Dr. Bonatatibus’s May 28 order and noted the 
receipt of the medical records on May 31.7  Harris reported that same day to 
Dr. Bonatatibus that no x-ray had been performed.  The record also demonstrates that 
Harris did not delay in executing Dr. Bonatatibus’s May 31 order to schedule an x-ray.  
Rather, on May 31, she scheduled the x-ray for June 3.  There is simply no evidence, 
circumstantial or otherwise, that Harris was aware that scheduling an x-ray for June 3 
would cause Miller harm.  Even if Harris forgot to inform Dr. Bonatatibus for three days 
that no x-ray had been performed earlier, at most that demonstrates negligence, which is 
not sufficient to make out a claim of deliberate indifference.  See Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67 
(explaining that “a prisoner must show more than negligence” to establish deliberate 
indifference). 
 Furthermore, a deliberate indifference claim premised on delayed medical 
treatment requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that “the delay … was motivated by non-
medical factors.”  Pearson, 850 F.3d at 537.  The lack of an identifiable medical reason 
explaining a treatment delay does not necessarily mean that the delay was motivated by a 
non-medical reason.  The record does not support finding that any delay attributable to 
Harris was motivated by non-medical factors, such as a desire to punish Miller, to lessen 
                                              
7  While an unidentified BCJ employee noted receipt of Heritage Valley’s fax on 
May 28, Miller did not link the notation to Harris.   
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her own workload, or to save BCJ money.  See, e.g., Durmer, 991 F.2d at 68-69 
(reversing summary judgment for defendant doctor, in part because the record contained 
evidence that the denial of medical treatment was motivated by a desire to avoid the 
“burden and expense” the prison would have incurred).8 
 B. Delay in Reporting X-Ray Results 
 Miller next argues that Harris and Wegner were deliberately indifferent for failing 
to relay the June 3 x-ray results to Dr. Bonatatibus before June 6.  Again, there is no 
evidence to establish when Harris or Wegner received the x-ray results.  Harris testified 
that she was away from her usual post between June 3 and June 6 for electronic medical 
record training, but she admitted she never called to check about the x-ray results.  The 
record supports, at most, a finding that she was either negligent in failing to review the x-
ray results prior to June 6 or negligent in failing to report the results to Dr. Bonatatibus 
until June 6. 
 Wegner examined Miller on June 4 and noted that Miller had a fracture.  
Interpreting the record in the light most favorable to Miller, we may infer that Wegner 
was aware of the x-ray results on June 4 when she made that notation.  Miller argues that 
                                              
8  Miller contends that Wegner was also deliberately indifferent by failing to order 
an x-ray on May 28 because the record shows she acknowledged Dr. Bonatatibus’s 
May 28 order in writing.  That order, however, directed the medical staff to first obtain 
Miller’s medical records to determine whether an x-ray had already been performed.  
There is no evidence Wegner received the records Heritage Valley faxed on May 28 or 
that the failure to check that the medical records had come in was anything more than 
negligence.  And, as is true of Harris, the record contains no evidence suggesting that any 
delay was motivated by non-medical factors. 
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because Wegner was a registered nurse, it would have been immediately apparent to her 
that further delaying treatment would expose him to excessive risk of harm.  The record, 
however, does not support that Wegner denied Miller medical treatment for his wrist 
fracture or that, between June 4 and June 6, she delayed any treatment already prescribed 
for Miller.  Even assuming that failing to immediately report the x-ray results to 
Dr. Bonatatibus or to otherwise inform him of her belief that Miller had a fracture rises to 
the level of medical malpractice, that showing is still not sufficient to make out a claim of 
deliberate indifference.9  See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346 (“[M]ere allegations of 
malpractice do not raise issues of constitutional import.”).   
 C. Circumstantial Evidence of Deliberate Indifference 
 Miller next contends that the totality of delays caused by Harris constitute 
circumstantial evidence that she was subjectively aware of the risk to Miller of delaying 
his treatment.  In addition to the delays in ordering an x-ray and reporting the results, 
Miller faults Harris for scheduling the appointment with Dr. Hirsch for June 10 and for 
failing to schedule a consultation with a hand surgeon.  
 The record does not support Miller’s inferential leap.  There is no evidence, direct 
or circumstantial, that Harris had a subjective awareness that the speed at which Miller’s 
medical care progressed put him at risk for suffering a malunion of his wrist.  That alone 
is sufficient to defeat Miller’s claim against Harris.  See Farmer, 511 U.S at 837 
                                              
9  To be clear, we are not tasked with deciding whether Harris or Wegner was 
actually negligent, or actually committed medical malpractice, because that issue is not 
before us.  Accordingly, we do not opine on that issue. 
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(explaining that a prisoner asserting an Eighth Amendment claim must show that “the 
[prison] official … [was] aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 
substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and [that the prison official also drew] the 
inference”).  Nor is Miller’s dissatisfaction with the speed at which his treatment 
progressed sufficient to establish deliberate indifference.  See, e.g., Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 
346 (explaining that “mere disagreement” over the proper course of medical treatment 
does not establish an Eighth Amendment violation).10 
 D. Southern Health Partners’ Liability 
 Last, Miller argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in granting summary judgment 
in favor of Southern Health Partners.  We agree with the Magistrate Judge that that 
defendant cannot be liable under a theory of municipal liability because Miller has failed 
to demonstrate that he suffered a violation of his constitutional rights.11  See City of Los 
                                              
10  Miller also argues that Harris, who was not licensed to practice nursing, 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of nursing by implementing three of 
Dr. Bonatatibus’s orders, namely, when she scheduled an x-ray, scheduled a doctor’s 
appointment, and provided Miller with “bottom bunk status.”  (App. 95-96.) While we 
need not resolve the issue, we note our doubt that performing ministerial tasks such as 
scheduling appointments or assigning sleeping placements constitutes the unauthorized 
practice of nursing in Pennsylvania.  See 63 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 653(10) 
(permitting non-licensed individuals to perform “[a]uxiliary services … including … 
minor and very basic nursing services for patients”).  Even if such acts did constitute the 
unauthorized practice of nursing, that does not transform ordinary negligence into a 
matter of constitutional concern. 
 
11  BCJ contracted with Southern Health Partners to serve as the jail’s medical 
services provider.  Because Southern Health Partners was acting under color of state law 
in that capacity, it was subjected to the municipal liability claim at issue here.  See 
Natale, 318 F.3d at 583-84 (analyzing claim against prison’s private medical services 
provider under a municipal liability framework). 
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Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (explaining that a municipality cannot be 
held liable pursuant to § 1983 if the plaintiff suffered no constitutional injury). 
IV. Conclusion 
 The record demonstrates Miller received medical care throughout his three-week 
incarceration at BCJ.  BCJ staff prescribed and provided Miller with pain medication, 
provided him with a sling, assessed his need for an x-ray, arranged for Miller to see an 
orthopedic specialist, and ensured that the state authorities to whom he was transferred 
were aware of his condition and the need to see a hand surgeon.12  To the extent the 
record demonstrates any culpability on the part of Harris or Wegner, it does not rise 
above negligence or simple medical malpractice.  Miller’s disagreement with his course 
of treatment, or the speed at which his treatment progressed, is insufficient to establish 
deliberate indifference to his wrist fracture. 
 We will therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment.  
                                              
12  We note that state authorities, not the Defendants, were responsible for 
scheduling Miller’s appointment with a hand surgeon three weeks after he was 
transferred to state custody.  Miller has raised no issue with that delay.  (See App. 63 
(Miller Expert Report) (“Upon entering the State Correctional System, Mr. Miller 
received the treatment his serious medical condition required … .”).) 
